Rethinking Social Severance: Post-Termination Contact between Birth Parents and Children Note by Williams, Alexis T.
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2008 
Rethinking Social Severance: Post-Termination Contact between 
Birth Parents and Children Note 
Alexis T. Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, Alexis T., "Rethinking Social Severance: Post-Termination Contact between Birth Parents and 
Children Note" (2008). Connecticut Law Review. 13. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/13 
609 
CONNECTICUT 
LAW REVIEW 
 
VOLUME 41 DECEMBER 2008 NUMBER 2 
 
Note 
RETHINKING SOCIAL SEVERANCE: POST-TERMINATION CONTACT 
BETWEEN BIRTH PARENTS AND CHILDREN 
ALEXIS T. WILLIAMS 
Upon the termination of their parents’ parental rights, many foster 
children are left without any positive, ongoing relationship with an adult.  
Some foster children will move from one placement to another and will 
ultimately age-out of foster care without having been adopted.  In light of 
this reality, courts are beginning to recognize the value of post-termination 
contact for children with little hope of adoption and strong emotional 
bonds to their birth parents. 
Post-termination contact allows children to retain their social 
relationship with terminated birth parents when birth parents are unable to 
care for their children but still play a positive role in their children’s lives.  
Post-termination contact may soften the effect of children’s loss of their 
parents, provide children with unique racial, ethnic, or religious 
experiences, and may encourage birth parents to voluntarily relinquish 
their rights in appropriate circumstances. 
This Note explores the legal framework that courts have employed to 
order post-termination contact.  Generally, courts have either granted 
post-termination contact as a right of the child or as a right of the birth 
parent.  Some jurisdictions recognize post-termination contact by judicial 
decision based upon broad statutes authorizing courts to make orders in 
the best interests of adjudicated children.  In other jurisdictions, 
legislatures have enacted statutes explicitly creating a right to petition the 
court for post-termination contact.  This Note offers a model statute that 
brings together the most successful pieces from current post-termination 
statutes, judicial decisions, and other model statutes. 
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 RETHINKING SOCIAL SEVERANCE: POST-TERMINATION CONTACT 
BETWEEN BIRTH PARENTS AND CHILDREN 
ALEXIS T. WILLIAMS ∗ 
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the 
nature of a child’s liberty interests in preserving established 
familial or family-like bonds . . . it seems to me extremely 
likely that, to the extent parents and families have 
fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate 
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests, and so, 
too, must their interests be balanced in the equation. 
     - Justice John Paul Stevens1  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1960s, courts have increasingly recognized that children not 
only have interests that should be “balanced in the equation,”2 but also 
constitutional and statutory rights independent of their parents’ rights.3  
Despite the increasing recognition of children’s rights,4 courts are still 
reluctant to put children’s rights on equal footing with those of adults.5  
Even in termination of parental rights proceedings, in which the focus 
arguably ought to be on a child’s right to be free from harm, parents’ rights 
are lost only to the State’s overriding interest in protecting its children.6  
                                                                                                                          
∗ Boston College, B.S. 2005; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2009.  I 
would like to thank Dean Anne C. Dailey for her guidance and suggestions throughout the development 
of this Note.  I am also grateful to Sarah Healy Eagan, Philip Torrey, and Justin Taylor for their 
comments and encouragement, and to the members of Connecticut Law Review for their hard work.  
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for lending their support in all of my endeavors.  
Any errors contained herein are mine and mine alone. 
1 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
2 Id. 
3 See Sarah Harton Clark, Note, Substantive Due Process In a State Of Flux: Should Courts 
Develop New Fundamental Rights for Alien Children?, 72 B.U. L. REV. 579, 582–83 & n.23 (1992) 
(noting that courts began expanding children’s constitutional rights in the 1960s).  
4 A child is said to have a right where a “legal rule commands some result for the purpose of 
benefiting” the child, and she has standing to enforce the rule.  James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of 
Children’s Existing Rights in State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 845, 849 (2003).  Professor Dwyer explicates children’s rights on a continuum.  See id. at 852 
(explaining that children’s rights can be subordinate or absolute).  For the purpose of this Note, 
however, a child’s “right” will refer to a legal rule primarily created to protect the child’s interests, 
which also provides the child with legal standing to enforce the legal rule, or what Dwyer terms an 
“absolute right.”  Id. at 853 & n.8. 
5 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 7–8 (2005). 
6 See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 55 (2006) (“The child might be 
said to possess [in termination of parental rights proceedings], at most, a reliance interest that receives 
protection, at the state’s discretion.”).  This is highlighted by the fact that most jurisdictions do not 
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Children’s interests are almost exclusively expressed as parental interests 
or states’ interests, as opposed to children’s rights.7 
In recent years, some courts have recognized a child’s right to maintain 
relationships with parent-like individuals.8  Most courts, however, remain 
reluctant to recognize the independent right of children to maintain 
relationships, and continue to subordinate these rights to the rights of 
adults, especially parents.9  Some courts even fail to recognize a child’s 
right to maintain relationships with their siblings upon the termination of 
parental rights,10 despite the consensus that children incur great benefit 
from ongoing sibling contact.11   
Not surprisingly, juvenile courts are even more reluctant to recognize a 
child’s right to maintain a social relationship with his or her birth parents 
upon the termination of parental rights.  Birth parents and children become 
legal strangers after the termination of parental rights.  Birth parents retain 
no legal rights or responsibilities in relation to their birth children.12  
Children, similarly, have no corresponding rights or responsibilities 
relating to their birth parents upon termination.13  The child will generally 
remain in foster care or a state-sponsored residential placement until the 
                                                                                                                          
allow children or their representatives to bring termination proceedings against their parents.  Id. at 54.  
Rather, the State or a party seeking to adopt the child must initiate the proceedings.  Id.  Professor 
Dwyer views termination provisions as a right of the parents because the proceedings focus on the 
behavior of the parent that led to the termination of the parent-child relationship, rather than focusing 
on a pure best interests of the child analysis.  Id.  Due to the emphasis courts place on parental rights, a 
child has no right to be relieved of a parent-child relationship that is not in her best interest unless the 
parent is found unfit by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at 58. 
7 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130–31 (1989) (“[The child] claims a due 
process right to maintain filial relationships with both [her legal and biological fathers].  This assertion 
merits little discussion . . . .  [A]t best, her claim is the obverse of [her biological father’s] and fails for 
the same reasons.”). 
8 See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018–19 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a 
child’s a constitutional right to “familial relations”); Meldrum v. Novotny, 640 N.W.2d 460, 470 (S.D. 
2002) (Konenkamp, J., concurring in part) (“Courts are beginning to recognize that a child has an 
independent, constitutionally guaranteed right to maintain contact with a person with whom the child 
has developed a parent-like relationship.”) (internal quotation omitted).  But see Dwyer, supra note 4, 
at 846–47 (noting that “courts in the U.S. [have not] attributed to children a constitutional right of any 
kind against the state when the state assumes and exercises the awesome power of determining their 
intimate associations”).  For an in-depth discussion of children’s relationship rights with parents and 
others, see generally DWYER, supra note 6.  
9 Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain 
Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV. 358, 380–81 n.141 (1994). 
10 See, e.g., William Patton & Sara Latz, Severing Hansel from Gretel: An Analysis of Siblings’ 
Association Rights, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 745, 747 & n.7 (1994) (citing a court that denied adult siblings 
standing to petition for visitation with minor siblings living with parents). 
11 CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE 368 (Marvin Ventrell & Donald N. Duquette eds., 2005). 
12 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-293 (Reissue 2004) (“An order terminating the parent-juvenile 
relationship shall divest the parent and juvenile of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obligations 
with respect to each other . . . .”). 
13 DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 381–82 (3d ed. 2007).  
But see Richard L. Brown, Disinheriting the “Legal Orphan”: Inheritance Rights of Children After 
Termination of Parental Rights, 70 MO. L. REV. 125, 131 (2005) (explaining that inheritance rights of 
children are retained in some jurisdictions after the termination of parental rights). 
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State finds an adoptive home for the child.14  Many children remain in 
“foster care drift” for years and eventually age-out of foster care without 
ever being adopted. 15 
The traditional framework for the termination of parental rights also 
assumes that children and their birth parents become social strangers.16  
Freeing children for adoption is one of the primary reasons states move to 
terminate parental rights.17  Termination is thought to symbolize a child’s 
newfound freedom from her past and her readiness for a rebirth of sorts, 
through adoption, in a new family.18  Legally, it also removes the rights of 
birth parents from the equation, allowing for the acknowledgement of new 
parental rights in adoptive parents.19 
Experience informs, however, that it is unrealistic to expect children to 
forget their birth families entirely and to experience a “rebirth” in foster 
care or adoptive homes.20  Rather, even young children have ties to their 
pasts that they carry into their adult years.21 
This Note proposes that social severance between a terminated parent 
and child may not always be in the child’s best interests.  Part II explores 
the legal and social consequences children face upon the termination of 
their parents’ rights.22  Not only are children legally severed from their 
parents, but children additionally experience the severance of an emotional 
attachment and social relationship.  Post-termination contact may provide 
some children the opportunity to maintain positive contact with their birth 
parents.  There is a large body of psychological research favoring contact 
                                                                                                                          
14 Cf. ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 13, at 432 (noting that children removed from their homes 
may be placed in foster care until they can be returned to their parents or adopted). 
15 Id. at 433; see also Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting and the Right 
to Protection for Older Foster Children: Creating Third Options in Permanency Planning, 48 BUFF. L. 
REV. 835, 860 (2000) (discussing the failure of federal legislation to address the needs of children who 
age-out of foster care). 
16 See ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 13, at 381 (noting that termination usually severs all ties 
between parents and children, especially when the child is adopted by strangers). 
17 Candace M. Zierdt, Make New Parents but Keep the Old, 69 N.D. L. REV. 497, 501 (1993); see 
also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (noting that New York sought the termination of 
negative parent-child relationships to free children for adoption).  The push for termination of parental 
rights to free children for adoption reflects the federal government’s priority to provide permanence for 
children.  CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 363–64.  When a child cannot be 
safely and permanently reunited with a birth parent, adoption is the next preferred permanency option 
for children.  Id. at 364. 
18 Marsha Garrison, Parents’ Rights vs. Children’s Interests: The Case of the Foster Child, 22 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 387 (1996). 
19 Cf. CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 365 (noting that adoptive parents 
have all the rights and responsibilities of birth parents, and thus adoption is the permanency plan of 
choice upon termination). 
20 See In re Guardianship of J.C., 608 A.2d 1312, 1321 (N.J. 1992) (“Although natural parents can 
be a disruptive influence for children who have been adopted, some commentators and psychologists 
believe that trying to eliminate the natural parents from the children’s lives and memory is impossible, 
and therefore wrong.”). 
21 Zierdt, supra note 17, at 507. 
22 See infra Part II. 
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between children and their birth parents in appropriate cases,23 and the 
importance of establishing a strong empirical foundation for post-
termination contact cannot be understated. 
Part III discusses the benefits and limitations of a child-centered 
approach to post-termination contact and proposes a more practical 
solution, suggesting that similar results may be achieved by granting 
standing to birth parents to pursue continued contact.  This Note then 
explores the adoption of a statutory framework in some states and the 
components of those statutes that are most and least effective.24  In Part IV, 
this Note discusses the importance of enforcement and modification 
mechanisms for post-termination orders, as the birth parent-child 
relationship may change over time.25  Finally, the Appendix to this Note 
provides the reader with a model statute compiled from the most effective 
sections of currently enacted and model post-termination statutes.26 
II.  POST-TERMINATION CONTACT IN CONTEXT  
A.  The Child Welfare System and the Termination of Parental Rights  
Each state has parens patriae authority to step into the constitutionally 
protected sphere of familial privacy27 to remove children temporarily or 
permanently upon finding that a child is in risk of harm.28  Upon the 
temporary removal of a child, a state is required to make “reasonable 
efforts” to reunify the family, unless extraordinary circumstances exist.29  
Reasonable efforts include providing intensive services and aide to both 
parents and children, such as housing subsidies.30  Furthermore, both 
parents and children have a right to visitation during a child’s removal 
from custody, again absent extraordinary circumstances.31 
                                                                                                                          
23 See infra Part II.B.1 (providing empirical support for post-termination contact for children). 
24 See infra Part III.C. 
25 See infra Part IV. 
26 See infra Appendix (providing a model statute for post-termination contact).  
27 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534–35 (1925) (holding that a law requiring 
public school attendance “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400, 
403 (1923) (holding that a law restricting language instruction in schools violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process rights of parents and teachers). 
28 ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 13, at 283. 
29 The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2000) (“[R]easonable efforts 
shall be made to preserve and reunify families (i) prior to the placement of the child in foster care, to 
prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (ii) to make it possible for a 
child to safely return to the child’s home.”); id. at § 671(a)(15)(D) (not requiring reasonable efforts 
when a parent has subjected the child to “aggravated circumstances,” committed enumerated serious 
crimes, or has had parental rights of a sibling involuntarily terminated). 
30 ABRAMS & RAMSEY, supra note 13, at 380–81; see also CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 11, at 228–29 (explaining that case plans detailing the services the state will provide to 
families are required by federal law). 
31 See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 828 (1977) (“The 
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Upon a court’s finding of abuse or neglect, the court has jurisdiction to 
enter a dispositional order in the dependency proceeding.32  An 
adjudication of abuse or neglect does not necessitate the termination of 
parental rights; rather, there are a number of alternative dispositions, 
termination being the most severe.33  The Adoption and Safe Families Act 
of 1997 (ASFA), however, has accelerated the timeframe within which the 
termination of parental rights must be sought against parents with children 
in state custody.34  When parental failure to rehabilitate results in a child’s 
placement in foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months, 
ASFA requires a state to petition the court to terminate parental rights to 
free the child for adoption.35 
Termination of parental rights severs all legal rights and 
responsibilities between the parent and child, legally ending the parent-
child relationship.36  The State becomes the statutory parent of the child 
until the child is adopted or reaches the age of majority as a “legal 
orphan.”37 
Traditionally, the severance of all ties between terminated parents and 
children, following the adjudication of parental unfitness, has been viewed 
as consistent with children’s need for permanence and stability.38  The 
traditional line of thinking posits that only once a child’s relationship, both 
legal and social, with her birth parents has ended is the child able to 
integrate fully into a new home, with new parents.39  Furthermore, there is 
concern that adoptive parents prefer to adopt children without ties to their 
birth parents; thus, contact with birth parents may restrict the pool of 
prospective adoptive parents.40 
                                                                                                                          
natural parent has not only the right but the obligation to visit the foster child . . . .”); Dwyer, supra 
note 4, at 945–46 & n.301, 302; see also In re Lisa, 429 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“A 
parent is rarely denied the opportunity to visit with his or her child even if he or she delays in asserting 
that right . . . . Thus, it is clear that visitation rights of a parent not in custody must be carefully 
guarded.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
32 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982). 
33 MARK HARDIN & ROBERT LANCOUR, EARLY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 3–4 (1996). 
34 CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 156. 
35 The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000).  Though expedited 
termination is justified by a child’s interest in achieving permanency and stability as quickly as 
possible, courts do not necessarily consider the likelihood that the child will be adopted in a termination 
proceeding.  See In re Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn. 1998) (“While . . . no one can 
predict with complete accuracy if or when the . . . children will be adopted, we also recognize the 
absolute certainty that if . . . parental rights are not terminated, the . . . children will never be 
adopted.”). 
36 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749 & n.1. 
37 Upon the termination of parental rights, children may be referred to as a “legal orphans.”  
Brown, supra note 13, at 126 & n.5. 
38 CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 365. 
39 Garrison, supra note 18, at 388. 
40 See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, in 
FAMILIES BY LAW 160 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004) (noting that some 
prospective adoptive parents want “the same constitutionally protected autonomy and privacy as other 
legal parents enjoy” and thus may not be amenable to a child’s continued contact with a birth parent). 
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Adoption, the prospect of entering a new family for a fresh and stable 
beginning, is seen as ultimately furthering children’s best interests.41  The 
traditional thinking therefore suggests that when birth parents are not able 
or willing, as determined by a court, to accept their children back into their 
homes within the statutory timeframe, the state must petition for 
termination of parental rights.42  The severance of any parent-child social 
relationship is the consequence of the termination of legal rights. 
B.  Post-Termination Contact: A Solution for Some Children 
In recent years, some courts have recognized the value of post-
termination contact43 between children and their birth parents.44  While the 
complete finality of termination proceedings serves the best interests of 
some children, it does not adequately address the reality of many children’s 
experiences in the child protection system.  The trend in court-ordered 
post-termination contact suggests courts increasingly acknowledge that 
many children will benefit from contact with their birth parents, despite the 
adults’ inability to care for their children as legal parents.45 
Post-termination contact may include a wide array of direct and 
indirect communications between children and their birth parents.  Contact 
may consist of a birth parent receiving reports of a child’s progress or a 
birth parent providing a child’s guardian with medical or other information 
of interest.46  Contact may also include direct communication between 
birth parents and children, such as phone calls, the exchange of letters and 
                                                                                                                          
41 See Garrison, supra note 18, at 388 (noting that “[t]he ‘fresh start’ offered by adoption may 
even confer psychological benefits”). 
42 See id. at 374 (“In foster care, however, the noncustodial parent is typically seen as a threat to 
the child’s relationship with her foster parent or her opportunity to obtain adoptive parents; termination 
of parental rights is urged whenever the child’s return home cannot be accomplished quickly.”). 
43 For purposes of this Note, post-termination contact refers to any contact between children and 
birth parents after birth parents’ parental rights have been legally terminated.  The term post-
termination contact is used to refer to contact between children and their birth parents, regardless of 
whether the children have been adopted.  While the existence of adoptive parents changes the analysis 
and thus will be discussed infra Part II.B.2., the emphasis of this Note is on the child’s right to post-
termination contact regardless of the existence of competing adult interests or rights.  Furthermore, 
post-termination contact expressed as a child’s right is assumed to be court-ordered, rather than 
contracted for by other parties in a child’s life, unless otherwise noted. 
44 See infra Part III.A.  In addition, the U.S. Children’s Bureau has also recommended that state 
laws authorize their courts to approve agreements for post-termination and post-adoption contact for 
children in foster care with individuals, including birth parents, who have “a significant emotional tie to 
the child.”  U.S. Children’s Bureau, Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing 
Permanence for Children, in FAMILIES BY LAW, supra note 40, at 172. 
45 Judge Douglas F. Johnson, Parent-Child Visitation After Termination of Parental Rights, THE 
JUDGES’ PAGE NEWSL. (The Nat’l CASA Ass’n & the Nat’l Council of Juv. and Fam. Ct. Judges), June 
2006, at 22–24, available at http://www.nationalcasa.org/download/Judges_Page/0606_family_ 
visitation_issue_0036.pdf. 
46 CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 368. 
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pictures, or periodic visitation.47 
1.  The Benefit of Post-Termination Contact  
Post-termination contact enables birth parents and children to continue 
a social relationship, lessening the psychological harm incurred from the 
ultimate separation of parent and child.48  The benefits of post-termination 
contact are most likely to result when children have established a 
significant emotional bond with their birth parents49 and are old enough to 
express a desire for continued contact.50 
For adolescents, continued contact with birth parents can lead to a 
better understanding of self.  The absence of post-termination contact may 
“enhance the child’s tendency toward self-blame or exaggeration; the child 
may idealize the absent parent, blame herself for disruption in the 
relationship, or exaggerate the parent’s flaws.”51  The children of birth 
parents whose parental rights have been terminated, especially those who 
are older at the time of the termination, undoubtedly grow up with 
questions regarding their birth parents and the events leading to the 
termination of the parent-child relationship.52  Children requesting contact 
with their birth parents may be less likely to run away from a placement or 
adoptive home if the child receives such contact.53 
                                                                                                                          
47 Cf. id. (noting that it is in some children’s interest to maintain some contact after adoption and 
that birth parents’ participation can have a positive impact on adoption).  
48 See CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 70–73 (summarizing the current 
research on the damaging effects of the separation of primary caretakers and children, especially during 
the early years of a child’s life); DWYER, supra note 6, at 285 (“Particularly with noninfants, complete 
severance of an existing parent-child relationship, even though it is insufficiently nurturing, can leave a 
child bewildered and with a lifelong sense of loss and uncertain identity.”); cf. Sonia Russell, Issues 
Relating to Long-Term, Out-of-Home Care for Children of Parents with Mental Illness, in CHILDREN 
OF PARENTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 2: PERSONAL AND CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 158–60 (Vicki 
Cowling ed., 2004) (suggesting that the termination of parental rights of parents with mental illness is 
not always an ideal solution, even if the child has been in long-term foster care); Marsha Garrison, Why 
Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 425 (1983) (arguing that available evidence 
suggests that a placement in which a foster child is free to continue contact with her birth parents is 
preferable to any placement that requires complete severance of contact with the birth parent). 
49 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of emotional attachments created in 
biological families, noting that “the importance of the familial relationship . . . stems from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association . . . as well as from the fact of 
blood relationship.”  Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 
(1977). 
50 Cf. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs. v. M.J., 889 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that termination of parental rights was warranted, but remanding the case to the trial court to 
consider whether post-termination communication would be in the children’s best interests because the 
children expressed interest in continued contact with their mother). 
51 Garrison, supra note 18, at 382. 
52 See Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Perspectives on Open Adoption, in FAMILIES BY LAW, 
supra note 40, at 164 (discussing the negative effects of closed adoptions, especially on adolescents). 
53 U.S. Children’s Bureau, supra note 44, at 172–73; see also CHILD WELFARE LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 379 (“Youth occasionally vote with their feet and run from foster care to 
be with their extended family, including the parents whose parental rights were previously 
terminated.”). 
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Furthermore, post-termination contact may soften the transition that 
follows the loss of a parent.54  Upon termination of parental rights, most 
children do not simply forget the existence of their birth parents and the 
circumstances surrounding the severance of the relationship.55  Rather, 
children continue to question and grapple with the issues surrounding the 
termination and their identities as the biological children of their birth 
parents.56  Continued contact with birth parents may facilitate children’s 
ability to integrate the prior relationship and experiences into their lives as 
foster children or adoptees.57  Furthermore, the exchange of family medical 
and health information between birth parents and children’s guardians is 
easier within an ongoing relationship between birth parents and children.58 
Continuing contact may also provide children with racial, cultural, 
ethnic, or religious knowledge and experiences offered by their birth 
parents but absent from their foster or adoptive homes.59  Minority children 
are disproportionately represented in the child protection system,60 and 
post-termination contact provides children with exposure to the cultural 
and religious experiences of their birth parents without limiting their pool 
of prospective adoptive families to those families with similar racial, 
cultural, ethnic, or religious backgrounds.61 
A birth parent’s unfitness does not necessarily signify his or her 
inability to play a positive role in the child’s life, nor does it necessarily 
signify the absence of an emotional bond or attachment between the child 
and parent.62  Likewise, a birth parent’s ability to play a positive role in a 
child’s life does not necessarily indicate that termination is not in the best 
interests of the child.63  Rather, post-termination contact with birth parents 
enables some children to feel connected to their pasts while also allowing 
                                                                                                                          
54 See Garrison, supra note 18, at 383. 
55 Professor Annette Ruth Appell likened adoption of older children to marriage, as opposed to 
birth, because “adoptees come to the adoption with life experiences that they and their adoptive family 
must incorporate into the new relationship.”  Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through 
Adoption: Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1012 
(1995). 
56 Id. at 999. 
57 See Annette Ruth Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency: Considerations in 
Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, in FAMILIES BY LAW, supra note 40, at 175 (noting that 
cooperative adoption allows “adoptees to integrate birth relationships or knowledge about those 
relationships into their developmental process”). 
58 U.S. Children’s Bureau, supra note 44, at 172. 
59 Id. 
60 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AFRICAN AMERICAN CHILDREN IN FOSTER 
CARE: ADDITIONAL HHS ASSISTANCE NEEDED TO HELP STATES REDUCE THE PROPORTION IN CARE 
(2007) (noting that a significantly greater proportion of minority children are in foster care settings). 
61 Cf. David D. Meyer, Lecture, Palmore Comes of Age: The Place of Race in the Placement of 
Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 185–86 (2007) (noting the use of race, in some 
jurisdictions, as a guide in making placements in adoptive homes). 
62 Zierdt, supra note 17, at 511. 
63 See id. (“A child may receive more benefit from a realization that although her parent is not 
able to care for her on a full time basis, the parent loves her . . . .”). 
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for the removal of circumstances surrounding the birth parent-child 
relationship that were previously unhealthy for the children.64  Even very 
limited post-termination contact may provide information to children and 
their guardians known only by birth parents.  Information regarding 
medical histories or children’s ancestral backgrounds can be 
communicated through letters or other media that are minimally intrusive 
to the birth parents and adoptive or foster parents.65 
Finally, a court’s authority to order post-termination contact in the best 
interests of the child may increase the likelihood that birth parents will 
consent to termination and voluntarily relinquish their parental rights.66  A 
birth parent’s knowledge of potential post-termination contact may assure 
the birth parent that she may not lose all contact with her child and thus 
decrease her opposition to termination.  A birth parent’s consent to an 
inevitable termination eliminates the negative effects of a drawn out and 
contested termination trial, including the postponement of stability for the 
child and the consumption of scarce judicial resources.67 
2.  Factors Supporting Post-Termination Contact for Children 
Post-termination contact is not in the best interests of every child.  
Many children will benefit from the permanency and stability of 
terminating all ties with their birth parents and forming emotional bonds 
with their foster or adoptive families.  Birth parents may not be willing or 
able to maintain contact with their children in a healthy manner, or a child 
may have developmental or psychological needs supporting the severance 
of the birth parent-child social relationship.68  Infants and very young 
children who have not formed strong emotional bonds with their birth 
parents and have high prospects for adoption may have their best interests 
served by severing contact with their birth parents.69  There are children, 
                                                                                                                          
64 Appell, supra note 55, at 1015. 
65 See id. at 1058 (arguing that birth parents wishing to sever all contact with their children should 
receive counseling regarding the importance of providing information about the birth family to the 
child or adoptive parents). 
66 See id. at 1021 (noting that permitting open adoption may encourage birth parents to relinquish 
their parental rights).  But see McCormick v. State, 354 N.W.2d 160, 161–62 (Neb. 1984) (concluding 
the parents had relinquished their rights by coercion because they falsely believed that they would be 
guaranteed the right to continue to visit their child upon the relinquishment of their parental rights). 
67 U.S. Children’s Bureau, supra note 44, at 173; see also Appell, supra note 55, at 1022 (stating 
that children whose parents consented to termination are “more likely to experience smoother 
adoptions” as compared to those children whose parents did not consent and had their rights terminated 
through litigation). 
68 See Appell, supra note 55, at 175 (noting that children with fears or insecurities related to either 
their birth parent or the permanency of a placement may not benefit from post-adoption contact); 
Garrison, supra note 18, at 383 (suggesting that parental contact should not continue when the child’s 
safety is threatened or there exists serious conflict between the birth parents and the foster or adoptive 
parents). 
69 Garrison, supra note 18, at 383. 
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however, whose chance for stability and permanency is low,70 and courts 
should have authority to order post-termination contact when it serves 
these children’s best interests.  In an imperfect child protection system, 
post-termination contact will be some children’s best chance for stability, 
and their only chance for continuity.71 
Some circumstances suggest that post-termination contact is more 
likely to be in a child’s best interests.  But, as in many analyses that require 
a determination of the best interests of the child, no one factor is 
determinative.  Rather, the existence of the enumerated factors below 
suggests that post-termination contact is more likely to be in the child’s 
best interests, whereas the failure of a given situation to meet the identified 
factors suggests that the complete severance of the parent-child social 
relationship is not in the child’s best interest. 
Factors suggesting that a child may benefit from post-termination 
contact include: (1) the foster child is older in age;72 (2) the nature and 
strength of the ongoing relationship between the birth parent and child; (3) 
the existence of important medical or family history known to the birth 
parent;73 (4) any unique cultural, ethnic, religious, or racial experiences or 
knowledge offered by the birth parent;74 (5) the child’s expressed desire to 
maintain a social relationship with the birth parent; (6) the ability and 
willingness of the birth parent to continue a relationship with the child;75 
and (7) the likelihood the foster or adoptive parents will assent to and 
support the post-termination contact.76 
While the benefit conferred on the child by post-termination contact is 
paramount, birth parents, foster parents, and adoptive parents may also 
                                                                                                                          
70 CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 233. 
71 See Garrison, supra note 48, at 461–64 (citing research findings that children in long-term 
foster care who were visited by their birth parents were better off than those with no contact with their 
birth parents, even when the visitation was infrequent and the parents were inadequate caregivers). 
72 Though the age of a child is enumerated as a relevant factor, it mainly serves to emphasize 
other factors that correlate highly with age.  An older child has the capacity to express her desire to 
maintain contact, has had a longer time to develop an emotional bond with her birth parent, and has 
been party to the parent-child relationship for a longer period of time.  Older children are also less 
likely to be adopted after the termination of parental rights.  Alice Bussiere, Permanence for Older 
Foster Youth, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 231, 236 (2006). 
73 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
74 See CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 368 (noting that it may be in the 
child’s best interest to maintain a connection to her birth parents to facilitate knowledge and 
understanding of her ethnic background). 
75 The parent’s positive feelings toward the prospect of continued visitation with the child is 
important because, as it stands, a child may be compelled to maintain a relationship with an adult but 
an adult cannot be compelled to maintain a social relationship with a child.  Dwyer, supra note 4, at 
985. 
76 Cf. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 37–38 (1979) 
(arguing that primary caretakers, in the divorce context, should be the sole decision-makers for their 
children because conflict over visitation is more damaging to children than separation from 
noncustodial parents). 
 2008] RETHINKING SOCIAL SEVERANCE 621 
benefit from post-termination contact.77  Continuing contact may diminish 
birth parents’ feelings of loss upon termination and allow foster and 
adoptive families to have access to information to which they would not 
otherwise.78  Children with birth, adoptive, or foster parents exhibiting 
approval of their post-termination contact will incur further benefits as 
their caregivers and birth parents exhibit, and the child internalizes, their 
approval.79 
III.  CHOOSING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POST-TERMINATION CONTACT  
Post-termination contact may be achieved by different legal 
frameworks.80  States differ on the availability of post-termination contact 
and, where available, the manner in which it may be achieved.  Post-
termination may be ordered pursuant to a specific statute detailing the 
conditions of visitation, or it may be judicially ordered pursuant to a 
court’s broader statute authorizing the court to make orders in the best 
interests of the child.81  Furthermore, courts and legislatures may approach 
post-termination contact as either a birth parent’s right or a child’s right.82 
Vesting the right in children provides both practical and symbolic 
significance,83 but, traditionally, children’s rights have lagged behind those 
of adults.84  As a result, the advantages of allowing children to petition a 
court for post-termination contact may be outweighed by states’ hesitancy 
to expand children’s rights.85 
                                                                                                                          
77 Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, in FAMILIES BY 
LAW, supra note 40, at 159. 
78 Id. 
79 See generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 76. 
80 Post-termination may also occur informally.  For example, a child may take the initiative to call 
her birth mother or a child in kinship care may see her birth father at family events.  The focus of this 
Note, however, is on creating legal rights that enable individuals to pursue and enforce post-termination 
contact in court. 
81 Compare TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.2061 (Vernon Supp. 2007) (detailing the conditions under 
which a court may order limited post-termination contact), with In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 
292, 299 (Mass. 2000) (“Our Probate Courts . . . [possess] inherent powers apart from statutory 
authorization.  These powers are broad and flexible, and extend to actions necessary to afford any relief 
in the best interests of a person under their jurisdiction.”). 
82 Compare In re Stacey D., 684 N.W.2d 594, 604 (Neb. App. Ct. 2004) (approaching post-
termination contact as the birth parent’s right), with In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 302 
(approaching post-termination contact as the child’s right). 
83 See generally Michael King, Children’s Rights as Communication: Reflections on Autopoietic 
Theory and the United Nations Convention, 57 MOD. L. REV. 385 (1994) (noting the symbolic value of 
recognizing children’s rights). 
84 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting that children’s rights have not been recognized 
to the full extent to which adults’ rights have been recognized). 
85 See Sharon Balmer, From Poverty to Abuse and Back Again: The Failure of the Legal and 
Social Services Communities to Protect Foster Children, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 960 (2005) 
(noting courts’ hesitancy to recognize children’s rights). 
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A.  A Child-Centered Model  
Standing to petition a court for post-termination contact may be vested 
exclusively in children, rather than granting birth, foster, or adoptive 
parents standing to move for post-termination contact, or relying on 
adoptive parents’ discretion to allow continued contact.86 
This model has the benefit of assuring children’s interests in 
relationships and continuity are served over the interests of the adults in 
their lives.  Allowing birth parents or other interested third parties to 
petition the court for continued contact enables adults to exploit children to 
satisfy their own needs and interests.  Children would have to rely on 
adults to seek contact, precluding a child’s guardian ad litem or attorney 
from pursuing post-termination contact in court.  Though post-termination 
contact may incidentally benefit the birth parent, vesting the ability to 
petition the court in the child is consistent with the growing child-centered 
approach in family law.87  This model also carries with it symbolic value;88 
it reminds the court and all parties involved that the child’s best interests 
are paramount, not the wishes of foster, birth, and adoptive parents. 
Furthermore, granting birth parents standing to petition the court for 
post-termination contact is inconsistent with termination proceedings, as it 
fails to truly divest parents of all legal rights in relation to their birth 
children.89  Adults with a personal interest in their relationship with foster 
children, such as birth parents, foster parents, or adoptive parents, may also 
be focused on the needs the child fulfills in their own lives.90  Rather than 
furthering the best interests of the child, an adoptive parent may be more 
concerned with having complete parental control over the child, or a birth 
parent may try to block adoption by petitioning the court for continued 
contact as a condition to adoption. 
A child-centered model necessarily renounces open adoption contracts 
between birth and adoptive parents.  Although allowing for many of the 
same benefits as court-ordered post-termination contact, the legal right 
does not ultimately belong to the child.  In open adoptions, post-adoption 
contact is wholly a construction of the contractual relationship between 
birth and adoptive parents.  In contrast, the child-centered model requires a 
court to order post-termination contact when it is in a child’s best interests, 
                                                                                                                          
86 Cf. In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 302 (noting that post-adoption contact is “grounded in 
the over-all best interests of the child . . . not in the rights of the biological parent”). 
87 Appell, supra note 55, at 1002. 
88 See generally King, supra note 83 (noting the symbolic value of recognizing children’s rights). 
89 Hollinger, Overview of Legal Status of Post-Adoption Contact Agreements, in FAMILIES BY 
LAW, supra note 40, at 160 (noting that post-adoption contact agreements are often presumed to be 
inconsistent with the “essential meaning” of adoption). 
90 See Appell, supra note 55, at 1023 (“[T]here is no guarantee that [birth and adoptive parents] 
will be able to rise above their own needs, fears, interests, and understandings to protect the child’s 
needs . . . .”). 
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regardless of whether the birth and adoptive parents are willing to contract 
for the contact.  Equally, it requires a court to abstain from granting post-
termination contact, despite an existing contract to the contrary, when it is 
not in the best interests of the child.  Upon court-ordered post-termination 
contact, the child is a party to the order and not merely a third-party 
beneficiary.91  The attitudes of birth parents and adoptive parents should 
bear heavily on the best interests of the child analysis, but they should not 
be determinative of the post-termination contact order.92   
This model also enables children to petition for the modification of 
post-termination contact orders as their needs change and they become 
integrated in a life that largely does not involve their birth parents.  An 
order for post-termination contact that allows for continuing jurisdiction93 
in the case of changed circumstances allows the nature and extent of the 
post-termination contact to change as a child’s developmental and 
emotional needs change.94  Most importantly, as a child nears adulthood, 
courts should consider the child’s wishes and reassess the desirability of 
court-ordered continued contact between the birth parent and the child.95 
The child-centered model requires either that a child’s constitutional 
right to post-termination contact is recognized or that children have 
statutory standing to pursue continued contact in court.  In states that have 
precluded children from seeking post-termination contact under their 
statutory schemes, children must assert a constitutional right to post-
termination contact based on their substantive due process right, under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to maintain relationships 
with their birth parents and other parent-like individuals.96   
As Justice Stevens asserted in his dissenting opinion in Troxel v. 
Granville, a child may very well have a liberty interest in her familial 
ties.97  Supreme Court jurisprudence has repeatedly recognized a 
fundamental liberty interest in familial relationships for adults, but has 
                                                                                                                          
91 Id. at 1049–50. 
92 But see id. at 1054–55 (“[T]he stress placed on a child whose adoptive or birth parents cannot 
accept each other may make visits more damaging than empowering for the child.”); Garrison, supra 
note 48, at 446–49 (describing Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit’s theory of permanence, which posits that 
“the risks of conflicting parental loyalties outweigh the advantages of maintaining contact”).  
93 A court ordering post-termination contact should also retain continuing jurisdiction for 
purposes of enforcing the order. 
94 Appell, supra note 55, at 1023 (indicating that one limitation to post-adoption contracts is their 
rigidity in light of a child’s changing developmental needs).  Note also that some states even allow for 
the reinstatement of parental rights after termination.  E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 712A.20 
(LexisNexis 2005). 
95 E.g., In re Alyssa W., 619 S.E.2d 220, 223–24 (W. Va. 2005). 
96 See Holmes, supra note 9, at 362–63 (arguing that children should be afforded “an independent 
liberty interest in their relationships” with parent-like individuals). 
97 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“While this Court has 
not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of a child’s liberty interests in preserving established 
familial or family-like bonds . . . it seems to me extremely likely that . . . so, too, do children have these 
interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.”). 
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failed to recognize children’s liberty interest in their familial 
relationships.98  Courts have given preference to adults’ rights, especially 
those of parents, over children’s rights, despite having recognized that 
children possess constitutional rights in other contexts.99 
In Michael H. v. Gerald D., Victoria, a child, and Michael, her 
biological (but not legal) father, brought concurrent substantive due 
process claims to protect their fundamental liberty interest in their 
relationship.100  The U.S. Supreme Court found Michael’s claim to be 
without merit and dismissed it.  The Court also dismissed Victoria’s claim, 
merely stating that it was weaker than Michael’s claim and noting that 
there was no tradition compelling the Court to recognize multiple 
fatherhood.101  The Court provided no further insight into children’s liberty 
interest in their familial relationships, nor did the Court preclude the future 
possibility of such a claim.102 
Given the Court’s opinion, written by Justice Scalia, that only 
traditionally protected liberty interests are to be recognized,103 a child’s 
liberty interest to maintain a relationship with a birth parent whose legal 
rights have been terminated may not fare well.  Traditionally, the 
termination of parental rights has resulted in the termination of both the 
legal and social parent-child relationship.104 
There is a marked inconsistency in the Court’s acknowledgement of 
the strength of children’s constitutional rights in some spheres, such as 
juvenile justice105 and free speech,106 but not in other spheres, such as their 
right to maintain relationships with family members, biological or 
otherwise.107  Most alarming is the innocence of children in the dissolution 
of their families through the termination of parental rights.108  Children are 
not responsible for their parents’ unfitness, yet upon the dissolution of 
parent-child relationships, courts do not recognize children’s liberty 
interest in furthering a social relationship with their birth parents.  
Legal parents presumably have a substantive due process right to 
                                                                                                                          
98 Holmes, supra note 9, at 363, 370. 
99 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985) (acknowledging a child’s rights 
under the Fourth Amendment); see also Holmes, supra note 9, at 381, 385. 
100 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989). 
101 Id. at 130–31. 
102 Holmes, supra note 9, at 372–73. 
103 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123. 
104 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-293 (Reissue 2004) (“An order terminating the parent-juvenile 
relationship shall divest the parent and juvenile of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and obligations 
with respect to each other . . . .”). 
105 E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985). 
106 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (recognizing children’s right to wear 
armbands in protest of the Vietnam War). 
107 See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130 (declining to state that “a child has a liberty interest, 
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship”). 
108 Holmes, supra note 9, 382–83, 392 (noting the child’s noninvolvement in creating the “‘legal’ 
barriers” that courts use to rationalize the denial of a child’s due process claim). 
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visitation with their children, though the U.S. Supreme Court has never 
ruled on the issue.109  Upon the dissolution of marriage, both parents retain 
parental rights with respect to their children.110  And even when a court 
order divests parents of visitation rights, they retain standing to petition a 
court for visitation with their children.111   
Why should children, by no fault of their own, be afforded less of a 
right to the same parent-child relationship upon the permanent dissolution 
of their family?  Though the state proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that the parent-child legal relationship is not in the best interests of the 
child in a successful termination,112 courts should make a separate 
examination of the parent-child social relationship upon a child’s motion.  
A child’s right to petition for post-termination contact follows from courts’ 
recognition of children’s substantive due process rights in other contexts 
and their recognition of legal parents’ right to visitation.  
Individuals with substantive due process rights in familial relationships 
have standing to proceed under that right.113  Accordingly, any court 
recognizing a child’s liberty interest in a relationship with a birth parent, 
must grant standing to a child seeking such a relationship.114  Furthermore, 
if the U.S. Supreme Court were to recognize a child’s liberty interest in 
post-termination contact, every state would have to grant standing to 
children in this context.115  States would be compelled to amend or enact 
third-party visitation or post-termination contact statutes to afford children 
standing to petition the court.116 
A second approach to child-centered post-termination contact is 
through judicial decision.  A state’s statutory authority to enter orders in 
the best interests of adjudicated children provides the basis for judicially 
imposed post-termination contact.117  To make such orders in the best 
interests of a child, a court must first establish that it has jurisdiction over 
the child. 
States generally confer exclusive original jurisdiction over children in 
                                                                                                                          
109 See, e.g., Swipies v. Kofka, 419 F.3d 709, 713–14 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a non-custodial 
father’s liberty interest was violated when his daughter was removed from his custody without due 
process). 
110 David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1461, 1482 (2006). 
111 Merle H. Weiner, Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes over Parental 
Relocation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1747, 1827 n.367 (2007). 
112 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
113 Holmes, supra note 9, at 396–97 & n.210. 
114 Id. at 396–97. 
115 Id. at 397.   
116 Id. at 397 & n.211.  
117 See, e.g., In re Christina L., 460 S.E.2d 692, 701 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that a circuit court 
may continue visitation with an unfit parent after parental rights are terminated if it is in the best 
interests of the child). 
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dependency proceedings in juvenile courts by statute.118  Upon 
adjudicating a child dependent, a juvenile court has jurisdiction to 
determine the disposition of the case, including, but not limited to, the 
termination of parental rights.119  The disposition of termination of parental 
rights gives a juvenile court continuing jurisdiction over the adjudicated or 
dependent child until the child reaches the age of majority or is adopted.120 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has taken a broad and 
child-centered approach to its authority to order post-termination contact 
and contested post-adoption visitation between birth parents and children.  
Post-termination or post-adoption contact is decided in every case in which 
either the parent or child raises the issue,121 and is decided according to the 
best interests of the child.122  In “those circumstances when termination 
proceedings occur and there is . . . no preadoptive parent identified,” the 
court further notes that “the equitable authority of the judge may be 
especially important in safeguarding the child’s best interests.”123  Thus, 
the court’s authority to order post-termination contact is greater where an 
adoptive family has not been identified for the child.  
In cases involving children with identified pre-adoptive families, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that “the equitable powers of 
courts in this area permit a judge, in her discretion, to evaluate an adoption 
plan proposed by the department that apparently did not contemplate 
visitation by the [birth] mother, and decide whether visitation is in the 
child’s best interests.”124  Post-termination contact in these circumstances, 
however, must be “carefully and narrowly crafted,” which is not a 
requirement in cases not involving prospective adoptive families.125  
                                                                                                                          
118 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-104(1) (2007) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, the 
juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings: (b) Concerning any child who is 
neglected or dependent . . . .”). 
119 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he juvenile court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings: 
(d) To terminate the legal parent-child relationship . . . .”). 
120 See Louise Gruner Gans, Priorities for Family Court Reform, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
629, 631 n.9 (2007) (“Through the introduction of the concept of the court’s continuing jurisdiction, a 
child’s progress from placement to discharge or to proceedings for termination of parental rights and 
adoption is tracked through what is in effect a single process, which now includes repeated planning 
conferences and permanency reviews.”). 
121 See In re Adoption of John, 759 N.E.2d 747, 754 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that the trial 
judge must make findings, although not extensive findings, regarding the appropriateness of post-
termination visitation when the issue arises). 
122 In deciding whether post-termination contact is in the child’s best interests, the court is to 
consider “significant, existing bonds between the child and a biological parent.”  In re Adoption of 
Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 303 (Mass. 2000).  Courts will also consider the history of parent-child 
visitation.  In re Adoption of Flora, 801 N.E.2d 806, 810–11 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).  For children 
hoping to be adopted in the future, the court should be cognizant of the negative impact post-
termination contact may have on the pool of prospective adoptive families.  In re Adoption of Vito, 728 
N.E.2d at 303.  Finally, the court should consider whether the child is living in a potential adoptive 
home and the emotional attachment the child has formed to her pre-adoptive family.  Id. at 303. 
123 In re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d at 301. 
124 Id. at 298–99. 
125 Id. at 304. 
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According to the court, the authority to order continued contact is not 
based in any statutory authority, but rather the court’s broad equitable 
powers to assure the child’s best interests.126  The court further held that 
post-termination contact is the child’s right and not the birth parent’s 
right.127  Therefore, both children and birth parents in Massachusetts may 
petition the court for post-termination contact, but the contact is ultimately 
considered the child’s right. 
The Supreme Court of West Virginia similarly held that post-
termination contact between a child and her birth parent is the right of the 
child, rather than a right of the birth parent.128  In recognizing the child’s 
right, the court cited cases recognizing a child’s right to “continued 
association with those with whom he or she shares an emotional bond.”129  
The West Virginia Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized a child’s right 
to post-termination contact,130 instructing the trial court to consider the 
child’s wishes when determining whether contact is in the best interests of 
the child.131 
B.  A Birth Parent-Centered Model  
Post-termination contact will never be in the best interests of a child 
unless his or her birth parent is not only willing to maintain contact, but is 
also committed to and invested in maintaining contact.  A court cannot 
force terminated parents to see their children, and a court should not 
subject children to rejection by parents who no longer retain parental 
rights. 
The importance of a birth parent’s commitment to post-termination 
contact allows a court to grant standing to birth parents, rather than 
                                                                                                                          
126 Id. at 299 (“Our Probate Courts . . . [possess] inherent powers apart from statutory 
authorization.  These powers are broad and flexible, and extend to actions necessary to afford any relief 
in the best interests of a person under their jurisdiction.”) (quoting In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 718 
(1982)). 
127 See id. at 302 (noting that a judge should focus on “emotional bonding and other 
circumstances of the actual personal relationship of the child and the biological parent, and not on the 
rights of the biological parent nor the legal consequences of their natural relation”). 
128 In re Christina L., 460 S.E.2d 692, 701 & n.9 (W. Va. 1995).  The Supreme Court of Appeals 
of West Virginia instructed the lower court, on remand, to consider whether “a close emotional bond 
has been established between parent and child and the child’s wishes, if he or she is of appropriate 
maturity to make such request.”  Id. at 701. 
129 Id. at 701 & n.9.  While it is beyond the scope of this Note, the Court’s language here suggests 
that the Court would similarly acknowledge a child’s relationship with other parent-like individuals and 
siblings. 
130 See, e.g., In re Alyssa W., 619 S.E.2d 220, 223–24 (W. Va. 2005) (recognizing a child’s right 
to post-termination visitation when it is in her best interests, but noting that it is usually granted to older 
children who have had time to establish emotional bonds); In re Katie S., 479 S.E.2d 589, 601 (W. Va. 
1996) (“[P]ost-termination visitation, either with siblings or parents, may be in the best interest of the 
child, especially when there is a close bond and the child maintains love and affection for either her 
siblings or parents.”). 
131 In re Alyssa W., 619 S.E.2d at 224. 
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children, with little practical effect.132  Enabling birth parents to petition 
the court avoids standing barriers that arise with children in some states 
and reinforces the understanding that post-termination contact is only 
beneficial to children when birth parents are committed to maintaining 
contact.  This model requires a statute or judicial decision recognizing birth 
parents’ standing to petition the court.133   
For example, the Nebraska Court of Appeals held that its juvenile 
court has continuing jurisdiction over adjudicated children to enter orders 
in their best interests, including post-termination contact orders, until they 
are adopted or reach the age of majority.134   
Initially, in In re Stacy D., a trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction 
to order post-termination visitation as part of termination proceedings.135  
The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, however, reasoning that the trial 
court had jurisdiction because the mother requested continued visitation 
prior to the termination of her parental rights.136  The Court of Appeals 
noted that the timing of the mother’s request was the probative factor that 
gave the court jurisdiction to enter a post-termination contact order; parents 
have no standing to petition for continued contact after termination of their 
rights.137  Thus, Nebraska is willing to recognize that post-termination 
contact benefits children in certain circumstances; however, only birth 
parents may petition the court. 
The birth-parent-centered model, nevertheless, does raise compelling 
questions regarding adoption and the rights of adoptive parents.  Upon the 
termination of parental rights, the most preferred permanency goal for 
children is adoption.138  Therefore, it should be made clear to both birth 
parents and children that, notwithstanding a post-termination contact order, 
it is in the best interests of the children that they remain available for 
adoption. 
Birth parents may be more willing to relinquish their parental rights if 
courts are willing to enter post-termination contact orders.139  Moreover, if 
                                                                                                                          
132 Vesting the right in birth parents rather than children may have a symbolic effect.  See King, 
supra note 83, at 385–86 (noting the symbolic value of recognizing children’s rights). 
133 For a proposed statute granting birth parents standing to petition a court for post-termination 
contact upon or after their parental rights are terminated, see Appendix, infra. 
134 In re Stacey D., 684 N.W.2d 594, 604 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).  Stacey and Shannon’s case 
provides an excellent example of children (aged nine and eleven at time of termination) who may 
benefit from both the termination of their parents’ rights and continued visitation.  Their mother, Pam, 
abused substances and had not been able to provide consistent and adequate housing for her daughters.  
Id. at 597.  Pam, however, had consistently visited the children throughout their placement in foster 
care.  Id. at 600.  Experts at the termination proceedings agreed that it was in the children’s best 
interests to have continued contact with their birth mother pending an adoptive placement.  Id.  For the 
trial judge’s perspective, see Johnson, supra note 45, at 22–24. 
135 Johnson, supra note 45, at 24. 
136 In re Stacey D., 684 N.W.2d at 603. 
137 Id.  
138 CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 364. 
139 Appell, supra note 55, at 1021. 
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courts are willing to do so, children may be less likely to resist their new 
adoptive homes.140  However, some courts have expressed concern that 
children with post-termination contact orders may appear less desirable to 
adoptive parents and are thus less likely to be adopted.141  It is impossible 
to predict whether prospective adoptive parents will be affected by the 
prospect of adopting a child in contact with her birth parents.  Additionally, 
post-termination contact may actually increase the likelihood that adoptive 
parents will adopt children into stable and permanent homes in some 
circumstances.  
It is especially important for courts to recognize that older foster 
children are less likely to be adopted than younger foster children,142 and 
while adoption may still remain a preferred placement, retaining a 
relationship with a child’s birth parent may allow the child to have a 
continuous adult relationship that would otherwise be absent.  In ordering 
post-termination contact for foster children, courts must also consider the 
infringement of post-termination contact on the constitutional rights of 
adoptive parents.143  A statutory model for ordering post-termination 
contact in the best interests of children, therefore, must consider possible 
constitutional challenges. 
Upon a child’s adoption, states vest adoptive parents with all of the 
legal rights and responsibilities of birth parents.144  This includes the well-
established constitutional right of parents to have custody of and control 
over their children, free from unreasonable government intrusion.145  Thus, 
a court order for post-termination contact may result not only in resentment 
on the part of adoptive parents wishing to make traditional decisions 
concerning their children, including with whom the child will have contact, 
but such a court order may also have significant constitutional implications 
for adoptive parents’ rights.146 
Adoption, however, is a state created status that changes the 
relationship of legal strangers into that of a relationship mirroring the birth 
                                                                                                                          
140 See U.S. Children’s Bureau, supra note 44, at 172–73 (noting that children requesting 
continued contact are less likely to resist placements if they receive continued contact). 
141 Hollinger, supra note 40, at 160.  But see In re Welfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717, 724 (Minn. 
1998) (holding that the court was not required to consider prospects for adoption when ordering 
termination). 
142 Bussiere, supra note 72, at 236. 
143 Cf. E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the 
Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 
97, 119 & n.100 (2006) (“The great weight of authority holds that the constitutional protection from 
state intrusion into the family that is afforded to adoptive parents is the same as that which is afforded 
to biological parents.”). 
144 E.g., Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1982) (“Adoptive parents have all the legal 
rights . . . in their children as natural parents.”). 
145 See Spitko, supra note 143, at 119 & n.100 (noting that adoptive parents have the same 
constitutional protection of familial privacy as biological parents). 
146 Appell, supra note 55, at 176.  
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parent–child relationship created by birth.147  There is an ongoing debate 
about whether adoption laws should be interpreted to protect the 
relationship between children and their adoptive parents, or alternatively, 
interpreted to keep birth parents and children together whenever 
possible.148 
The Proposed Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 provides that, upon 
adoption, “each adoptive parent and the adoptee have the legal relationship 
of parent and child and have all the rights and duties of that 
relationship.”149  But, the relationship between adoptive parent and child 
has not been treated uniformly among the states,150 nor must it match the 
status relationship of birth parents and children exactly.  As a state created 
status, adoption is necessarily subject to state control and involvement.151  
The state determines who may adopt, who may be adopted, and the legal 
consequences of adoption.152  States not only have the authority to regulate 
adoption, but also the authority to construct the terms of adoptive parents’ 
rights.  Therefore, states, by statute, may limit the rights of adoptive 
parents to control their adoptive children’s contact with their birth parents, 
furthering the best interests of the adoptee.   
States should not fail to recognize their responsibility to further the 
best interests of children in fear of potentially infringing on adoptive 
parents’ rights.  Not all children will find adoptive homes, and even those 
who are adopted may spend a significant amount of time in foster care 
between termination proceedings and adoption proceedings.153  Therefore, 
children’s best interests should be prioritized regardless of whether it 
requires the infringement of adoptive parents’ rights to control their 
children.   
This framework is somewhat contrary to the traditional role of 
termination of parental rights proceedings, which divests birth parents of 
all legal rights to their children.  But it also works to further the purpose of 
the termination of parental rights framework by furthering the children’s 
                                                                                                                          
147 Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
150, 190 (1999). 
148 Hollinger, State and Federal Adoption Laws, in FAMILIES BY LAW, supra note 40, at 37.  
149 Proposed Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) of 1994, in FAMILIES BY LAW, supra note 40, at 77. 
150 See Naomi Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoptees’ Inheritance Rights, in FAMILIES BY 
LAW, supra note 40, at 78 (noting states’ differing treatment of adoptees’ inheritance rights). 
151 Cahn & Singer, supra note 147, at 190. 
152 Id.  
153 In 2006, 126,967 children in the United States were in foster care and waiting to be adopted.  
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Administration for Children and Families, Children in Public 
Foster Care Waiting to be Adopted: FY 1999 thru FY 2006, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/ 
stats_research/afcars/waiting2006.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2008).  This does not include children aged 
sixteen or older whose permanency goal was not adoption.  Id.  Forty-three percent of children adopted 
after the termination of parental rights proceedings waited one year or longer to be adopted.  U.S. Dep’t 
of Health & Hum. Servs., Administration for Children and Families, The AFCARS Report, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report14.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2008). 
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best interests through judicial orders.   
C.  The Statutory Framework for Post-Termination Contact  
Few states expressly provide for post-termination contact by statute.154  
Many more states have enacted legislation allowing for the enforcement of 
post-adoption contact.  The basis for enforcement, however, is not the best 
interests of the child, but rather the adoptive and birth parents’ contractual 
agreement.155   
Statutory provisions for post-termination contact provide courts with 
further confidence in termination cases in which children have expressed a 
desire to remain in contact with their birth parents but preservation of the 
legal parent-child relationship is not in the child’s best interests.156  It is not 
suggested that post-termination contact should facilitate the termination of 
parental rights when not in the best interests of the child.  However, 
allowing courts to recognize children’s wishes regarding their permanency 
plan, while concurrently acting in their best interests, is certainly an 
advantage to having the statutory authority to order post-termination 
contact. 
Ideally, a statute granting juvenile courts authority to order post-
termination contact should: (1) allow both children and birth parents to 
petition the court; (2) allow the court to order post-termination contact only 
when it is in the child’s best interests; (3) specify factors the court should 
consider in its determination of the child’s best interests; (4) require the 
court to specify the frequency and the nature of any ordered post-
termination contact; and (5) provide the court with continuing jurisdiction 
over the case for purposes of enforcement and modification.157 
Texas, by statute, grants its courts authority to include a provision for 
limited continued contact between a birth parent and child in an order 
terminating parental rights.158  The statute requires that post-termination 
contact is in the best interests of the child,159 and that it may only be 
ordered upon the voluntarily relinquishment of parental rights160 and 
                                                                                                                          
154 Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West 2003) (providing for post-termination contact, in 
some circumstances, by statute); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061 (Vernon Supp. 2007). 
155 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS 
BETWEEN BIRTH AND ADOPTIVE FAMILIES: SUMMARY OF STATE LAW 4, 42 (Dec. 2005), available at 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/cooperativeall.pdf, for a summary of 
the enforceability of open adoption agreements in the United States. 
156 See Dep’t of Child. & Family Servs. v. M.J., 889 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding that termination of parental rights was warranted, but remanding the case to the trial court to 
consider whether post-termination communication would be in the children’s best interests because the 
children expressed interest in continued contact with their mother). 
157 See infra Appendix for a model statute for post-termination contact. 
158 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061 (Vernon Supp. 2007). 
159 Id. 
160 Id.   
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agreement between the birth parent and child protective services.161  The 
terms of the post-termination contact order are not modifiable,162 and such 
post-termination orders may not require a subsequent adoption order to 
include provisions for post-adoption contact.163 
Though the statute sets the stage for courts to consider post-
termination contact orders, the statute has limitations.  The first limitation 
is the provision prohibiting modification of a post-termination contact 
order.164  Modification of an order providing for continued contact is 
necessary to account for the changes that inevitably take place in such a 
relationship.165  The needs, behavior, and circumstances of both children 
and parents will undoubtedly change as they age, and their relationship 
evolves away from the parent-child model.166 
Finally, though birth parents necessarily need to agree to post-
termination contact if they are to participate in a healthy manner, child 
protective services should not have the authority to preclude continued 
contact when all other parties agree it is in the child’s best interests.  
Children are required to have their own guardian ad litems or attorneys in 
child protection proceedings, presumably because child protection services 
have priorities and considerations not wholly consistent with the best 
interests of every child.167  The statute also does not require the court or 
child protection services to consider enumerated factors indicative of a 
child’s best interests.168  Thus, child protective services and courts may be 
swayed by the rights of adults or institutional concerns in their 
consideration of an order for continued contact. 
Florida and Louisiana have broad post-termination contact statutes 
protecting a child’s relationships, pending adoption, with birth parents, 
siblings, and the birth parents’ relatives, when it is in the child’s best 
interests.169  Florida’s statute also requires the nature and frequency of the 
contact to be included in the court’s order.170  The order may be reviewed 
upon the motion of any party or a prospective adoptive parent, and the 
                                                                                                                          
161 Id. 
162 Id. § 161.2061(e). 
163 Id. § 161.2062(a). 
164 Id. § 161.2061(e). 
165 For further discussion regarding the benefit of allowing modification to post-termination 
orders, see infra Part V. 
166 See infra Part IV (discussing the importance of enforcement and modification clauses in post-
termination contact statutes). 
167 See Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 67, 68 (1995) (footnote omitted) (“A growing consensus has rejected the traditional 
assumption that persons involved in legal proceedings will look out for the interests of the child.  Even 
when a child’s interests are at stake, the other participants in the proceeding cannot be counted on to 
speak for the child.”). 
168 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.2061.  
169 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b) (West 2003); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. ART. 1037.1(A) (West 
2004). 
170 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.811(7)(b). 
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nature and frequency of the contact must be reviewed by the court upon the 
child’s placement for adoption.171  While Florida and Louisiana’s statutes 
allow for recognition of a broad base of children’s relationship rights, they 
lack detail concerning many issues that are likely to arise in post-
termination contact orders, such as the factors to consider in the best 
interests of the child analysis and the enforcement of the order.  
Other states have determined, either by judicial decision or statutory 
enactment, that their courts do not have the authority to order post-
termination contact.172  In a state that has expressly refused to order post-
termination contact under its existing statutory framework, a child’s right 
to post-termination contact will only be recognized through a statutory 
revision or the recognition of a constitutional right to post-termination 
contact by the Supreme Court. 
The South Dakota legislature enacted a law prohibiting courts from 
ordering post-termination visitation or open adoptions, abrogating an 
earlier decision by the South Dakota Supreme Court ordering post-
termination contact.173  The South Dakota Supreme Court previously held 
in In re S.A.H. that a trial court has the authority to order post-adoption 
contact.174  The court determined that, while the interests of the adoptive 
parents should be considered by the trial court, the best interests of the 
child should be paramount in deciding whether to order an open 
adoption.175  In determining whether post-adoption contact should be 
ordered, the court instructed the trial court to weigh the psychological 
benefit of knowing the child’s cultural and religious background, the effect 
of the adoption on the child’s integration into an adoptive family, and the 
effect an open adoption would have on the availability of prospective 
adoptive families.176   
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine similarly held that the nature of 
termination proceedings—namely, a final severance of the parent-child 
relationship—divests the court of any authority to make orders imposing 
continued contact between the child and the birth parent.177   
                                                                                                                          
171 Id. 
172 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (2004) (by statutory enactment); In re Elizabeth D., 
888 A.2d 281, 282–83 (Me. 2006) (holding that “an order terminating parental rights deprives the court 
of any authority to impose a condition that preserves contact between the parent and the child”). 
173 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-17 (2004) (abrogating the South Dakota Supreme Court decision 
In re S.A.H., 537 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1995), which allowed circuit courts to order open adoptions and post-
termination contact). 
174 In re S.A.H., 537 N.W.2d 1, 6 (S.D. 1994). 
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 7. 
177 In re Elizabeth D., 888 A.2d 281, 282–83 (Me. 2006) (“The court’s attempt to terminate the 
mother’s rights to her children and concomitantly to preserve her relationship with them by requiring 
the Department to provide for continuing visitation was beyond its authority.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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IV.  ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF POST-TERMINATION ORDERS  
The enforcement of post-termination contact poses potential 
jurisdictional and logistical constraints.  To enforce an order by a court 
granting post-termination contact, the court must retain continuing 
jurisdiction over the child.178  Birth parents may petition the court to 
enforce or modify a visitation order.  As with other child visitation 
scenarios, courts may appoint guardian ad litems to allow children, through 
their representatives, to enforce their rights when their caregivers do not 
facilitate the ordered contact.179  
When termination proceedings and adoption proceedings are ordered 
by different courts, or there is a lapse between the two orders, the order for 
post-termination contact, as part of the termination disposition, is not 
binding on the court granting the adoption.180  One option courts have for 
circumventing this jurisdictional problem is to grant adoption orders 
conditional upon post-termination contact at the time of termination 
proceedings.181 
Providing a mechanism for the modification of post-termination 
contact orders is crucial to ensure the best interests of the child.182  Given 
the unstable nature of the relationship between a child and a birth parent 
whose parental rights have been terminated, circumstances may change 
subsequent to the initial order.  The birth parent may choose to become less 
involved in the child’s life, the circumstances that led to the termination 
may worsen, or new adverse circumstances may arise in the parent’s life.  
The child’s developmental or psychological needs may change with age, or 
the circumstances surrounding her permanency plan may change.183  
Continued evaluation of the child’s psychological and developmental 
needs, the effect of the contact on the child, and the birth parent’s ability to 
                                                                                                                          
178 See Appell, supra note 55, at 1051 (noting that a court must retain continuing jurisdiction to 
enforce post-adoption contact). 
179 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Children by F., 406 A.2d 986, 989 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) 
(appointing a guardian ad litem to enforce the court’s visitation order with the children’s birth father, 
upon adoption by their stepfather). 
180 Appell, supra note 55, at 1045. 
181 See id. (noting that some courts include plans for postadoption contact in orders terminating 
parental rights).  But see M.M. v. Parents of M.M., 619 N.E.2d 702, 709–10 (Ill. 1993) (holding that 
the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over adoptive parents after the termination of the birth 
parent’s rights, and thus could not enter orders binding upon them). 
182 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has noted that “[t]he purpose of [post-termination] 
contact is not to strengthen the bonds between the child and his biological mother or father, but to assist 
the child as he negotiates, often at a very young age, the tortuous path from one family to another.”  In 
re Adoption of Vito, 728 N.E.2d 292, 304 (Mass. 2000).  Courts ordering post-termination contact for 
this purpose may encourage modification as children become more settled in their permanent 
placements.  See id. at 306 & n.29 (noting that the court may order decreased post-adoption contact, but 
not increased post-adoption contact). 
183 See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. J.S.W. v. Reuther, 827 So. 2d 1199, 1205 (La. Ct. App. 2002) 
(limiting post-termination contact between a child and his birth parent from weekly visits to four times 
a year because the frequent visits were not in the child’s best interests). 
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have a positive impact on the child is necessary to assure that the continued 
contact remains in the best interests of the child. 
A guardian ad litem who suspects that continued contact is no longer 
in the child’s best interests, or upon the request of the child, should petition 
the court for a review hearing to determine whether the post-termination 
order should be modified or vacated.  All parties involved should have 
standing to petition the court to modify or vacate the order to ensure that 
the court has the most complete information possible upon which to base 
its best interests of the child analysis.   
V.  CONCLUSION  
Though states are beginning to recognize the potential benefit of post-
termination contact, many states still do not use their jurisdiction over 
dependent children to order continued contact in appropriate cases.  Post-
termination contact may be unprecedented in many jurisdictions, but 
entering orders to further the best interests of children has long been 
practiced in juvenile courts across the country.   
In light of the number of older children in foster care awaiting 
adoption, post-termination contact allows children with a strong emotional 
bond with their birth parents to experience a smoother transition.  
Continued contact may not serve the best interests of every child, but 
courts should recognize their jurisdiction to enter such orders where it is in 
the best interests of the child. 
In the absence of a constitutional right to such continued contact, 
individual jurisdictions should follow states like Louisiana and 
Massachusetts and recognize children’s rights to post-termination contact 
through either judicial decision or statutory enactment. 
Finally, despite the option for open adoption agreements between birth 
parents and adoptive parents in many states, post-termination contact does 
not uniformly meet the needs of children unless both children and birth 
parents have standing to petition the court for contact and enforcement.  
Only when courts allow the interests of children to override the needs and 
desires of birth and adoptive parents will our children be properly served. 
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APPENDIX: 
A MODEL STATUTE: POST-TERMINATION CONTACT BETWEEN CHILDREN 
AND BIRTH PARENTS 
(1) Upon entering an order terminating parental rights, the court shall 
consider a petition by the birth parent for post-termination contact 
between the child and his or her birth parent. 
(2) Any child under the jurisdiction of the court has standing under 
this statute to bring a petition for post-termination contact or a 
petition to enforce or modify a prior order for post-termination 
contact.   
(3) The court shall order post-termination contact upon determination 
that it is in the best interests of the child.   
(4) Post-termination contact between the child and the birth parent 
may consist of, but is not limited to, phone calls, the exchange of 
letters and photographs, the exchange of medical and health 
information, and supervised or unsupervised visitation. 
(5) The court shall determine whether the post-termination contact is 
in the best interests of the child by considering:  
(a) the child’s wishes, if the child is of sufficient age or 
maturity; 
(b) the birth parent’s expressed interest in maintaining contact;  
(c) the frequency and quality of the visitation between the 
child and birth parent after the child was removed from the 
birth parent’s care and prior to the termination 
proceedings;  
(d) unique racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious knowledge or 
experience that the birth parent could provide the child; 
(e) the desirability of maintaining contact for medical 
purposes;  
(f) the strength of the emotional bond between the child and 
the birth parent;  
(g) the effect post-termination contact may have on the child’s 
pool of prospective adoptive families; and 
(h) other factors bearing heavily on the appropriateness of 
post-termination contact between the child and the birth 
parent. 
(6) Upon entering a post-termination contact order, the court shall 
include in the order the nature and frequency of the contact 
determined to be in the best interests of the child. 
(7) Birth parents may petition the court for enforcement or 
modification of existing post-termination contact court orders. 
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(8) Child Protection Services and the child’s guardian ad litem must 
continue to evaluate contact ordered pursuant to this statute every 
180 days to determine whether continued contact remains in the 
child’s best interests.   
(9) Nothing in this statute shall be construed as affecting the finality of 
the order terminating parental rights. 
 
 
 
 
